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I AGREED TO WHAT?: PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM UNFAIR 
PRACTICES IN BINDING CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
 
Laura Magnotta* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2011 Maryland House Bill 442 was enacted into law.1  The Act, entitled 
Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act, is aimed at protecting 
consumers who become parties to binding consumer arbitration, particularly through adhesion.2  
The Act requires that specified arbitration organizations collect, publish and make available 
information relating to binding consumer arbitration.3  Additionally, the Act lays out specific 
guidelines for how and when the information is to be published.4  Failure to comply with the 
requirements of the Act can result in the arbitration agreement being deemed unconscionable or 
unenforceable, but may not be “the sole reason to refuse to enforce an award made in consumer 
arbitration.”5  A prior attempt at similarly protecting consumers’ interest in binding arbitration 
was introduced in the Maryland House of Delegates in 2010, was passed out of the House, but 
died in the Senate coming up one vote shy of passage in the Senate Finance Committee.6 This 
article will discuss specific aspects of the new law, place the law within the context of other 
attempts to protect consumers in binding arbitration, and discuss the practical implications of the 
law.  
II.  CONSUMER PROTECTION – TRANSPARENCY IN CONSUMER 
ARBITRATIONS ACT 
The Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitration Act applies “to an 
arbitration organization that performs an arbitration activity related to 50 or more consumer 
arbitrations during a five-year period.”7  As defined by the Act, “arbitration activity” includes 
participation in any one or more aspects of arbitration including “initiation, conduct, sponsorship, 
or administration of, or the appointment of an arbitrator.”8  Additionally, consumer arbitration is 
defined as “binding arbitration conducted in accordance with a consumer arbitration agreement.”9  
                                                     
* Laura Magnotta is an Associate Editor of The Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation and a 2013 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. 
1 See H.B. 442, 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011) (enacted) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3901-
3905 (West 2011)). H.B. 442 was crossfiled with S.B. 309 (See S.B. 309, 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011) (enacted) 
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3901 to -3905 (West 2011))). 
2 See Consumer Protection—Transparency in Consumer Arbitration Act, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-
3901-3905 (West 2011). 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3905(b)(1)-(2) (West 2011). 
6 See H.B. 379, 427th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010).   
7 MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3902 (West 2011). 
8 Id. § 14-3901(b). 
9  Id. § 14-3901(e)(1). 
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This does not include binding arbitration resulting from an agreement for property insurance, 
casualty insurance or surety insurance; arbitration according to “arbitration rules adopted by a 
securities self-regulatory organization and approved by the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission”; or consumer arbitration involving an institution licensed by the Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene if the agreement to arbitrate is not a mandated condition for 
admission into the institution.10 
A. Required Information 
Arbitration organizations that are subject to the Act are required to “collect, publish, and 
make available to the public…information regarding each consumer arbitration for which it 
performed an arbitration activity during the preceding five-year period.” 11  The information 
required to be published includes: the name of the non-consumer party; whether the dispute 
involved goods, services, real property or credit; the type of claim or cause of action; which party 
prevailed; “the number of times during reporting period that the non-consumer party has been a 
party in a consumer arbitration for which the arbitration organization performed an arbitration 
activity”; the name of the attorney representing the consumer party; “the date the arbitration 
organization received the demand for the consumer arbitration, the date the arbitrator was 
appointed, and the date of disposition by the arbitrator or arbitration organization”; the type of 
disposition of the dispute; the amount of the claim, award or any other relief granted; the name of 
the arbitrator, their fee and the percentage of the arbitrator’s fee allocated to each party; and the 
address of where the consumer arbitration was conducted.12  
B. Publication Method 
The required information is to “be reported beginning on the first day of the month 
following the month an arbitration organization becomes subject to this [Act]” and “shall be 
updated at least quarterly thereafter.”13  More specifically, to be made sufficiently available to the 
public, the required information shall be published in a “computer-searchable format that is 
accessible at the Internet Web site of the arbitration organization and may be downloaded without 
a fee.”14  The information shall also be made available in writing on request “at a fee that does 
not exceed the actual cost to the arbitration organization of copying the information.”15 
C. Uses for Information/Failure to Comply 
The requirement for arbitration organizations to collect information regarding consumer 
arbitration can affect organizations in two main ways.  First, the information provided by the 
arbitration organization as required by the Act “may be considered in determining whether a 
                                                     
10 See id. § 14-3901(e)(2)(i)-(iii). 
11 Id. § 14-3903(a). 
12 See id. § 14-3903(a)(1)-(11). 
13 Id. § 14-3903(b)(1). 
14 Id. § 14-3903(c). 
15 Id. 
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consumer arbitration agreement is unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under the law.”16  
Second, while an arbitration organization’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Act “may 
not be the sole reason to refuse to enforce an award made in a consumer arbitration,” it “may be 
considered as a factor in determining whether a consumer arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable under the law.”17  
An arbitration organization’s failure to comply with the Act allows “a consumer or the 
Attorney General [to] seek an injunction to prohibit an arbitration organization that has engaged 
in or is engaging in a violation of §14-3903…from continuing or engaging in the violation.”18  If 
the court issues an injunction or the arbitration organization voluntarily complies with §14-3903 
after the action is filed, the organization is liable to the person bringing the action for an 
injunction for the person’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.19 
D. Liability for Reporting 
To encourage reporting of required information, the Act includes a provision that shields 
arbitration organizations from liability for reporting the information.20  Under the Act, “[a]n 
arbitration organization is not liable for collecting, publishing, or distributing the information 
required under [the Act].”21  This provision precludes a party whose information was published as 
required by the Act from suing the publishing arbitration organization.  
III.  ANALYSIS 
The need to protect consumers in binding arbitration is not a new concept.  Several cases 
and specific situations throughout the United States have highlighted the need for consumer 
protection in binding consumer arbitration particularly where the arbitration agreement is 
adhesionary.  Issues arise as a result of how consumers, who are often forced into arbitrating their 
claims, are treated during the process.  Without transparency in the consumer arbitration process, 
consumers are typically faced with a foreign process against an entity that has participated in the 
process numerous times and has the benefit of familiarity with the process, familiarity with the 
arbitrator(s) or arbitration organization, and institutional memory and resources.   
The basis for issues arising out of binding consumer arbitration concerns the adhesionary 
nature of the arbitration agreements where consumers can either agree to the arbitration 
agreement or forego the transaction altogether.  The fact that the contract is adhesionary does not 
make it per se unconscionable or unenforceable.  The Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion mentioned that adhesionary contracts remain enforceable because of the proliferation 
of their use.22  The problems with these types of adhesionary arbitration agreements arise when 
                                                     
16 Id. § 14-3904. 
17 Id. § 14-3905(b). 
18 Id. § 14-3905(c)(1). 
19 See id. § 14-3905(c)(2). 
20 See id. § 14-3905(a). 
21 Id.  
22 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (“[T]he times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”). 
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either the consumer does not know that they have entered into an agreement to arbitrate their 
disputes, or, if they are aware of the agreement to arbitrate, they either 1) do not expect to need it, 
2) do not fully understand the ramifications, or 3) value the benefits of the product or service over 
the costs of arbitration.  This lack of knowledge on the part of the consumer allows non-
consumers to navigate a system with which they are familiar in a way that is potentially harmful 
and unfair to the consumer.  
This issue was more specifically addressed in Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 
Inc.  In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennard noted the potential for unfairness in binding 
consumer arbitration where contracts are adhesionary.23  This unfairness arises when businesses 
and/or arbitrators in binding consumer arbitration become repeat players in the arbitration system 
causing “arbitrators [to] consciously or unconsciously bias their decisions in favor of an 
organization or industry that hires them regularly as an arbitrator.”24  While the majority of the 
court in Engalla did not find that Permanente Medical Group’s method of selecting arbitrations 
made the contract to arbitrate unconscionable, they did find that Permanente’s practices were 
contrary to those of reputable neutral, third party arbitration organizations.25  Subsequently, the 
California Supreme Court affirmed the need for neutral arbitrators in Armendariz v. Foundation 
Health Psychcare Services, Inc.26 
To prevent the possibility of non-consumer parties taking advantage of the 
binding consumer arbitration process at the cost of the consumer, it is essential that 
consumer arbitration is made fair through the use of neutral and impartial arbitrators.  
Arbitration institutions have taken affirmative steps towards ensuring fairness and 
transparency in consumer arbitration by implementing protocols and other regulations 
requiring arbitrator neutrality. 27  In 1997, the National Consumer Disputes Advisory 
Committee promulgated recommendations for ensuring fairness in consumer arbitration 
entitled Due Process Protocol for the Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer Disputes, 
which were later adopted by the American Arbitration Association. 28  Principle three of 
the protocol addresses “Independent and Impartial Neutrals and; Independent 
Administration.”  The principle entitles all parties to arbitration procedures administered 
by an independent ADR institution and overseen by an independent and impartial 
                                                     
23 See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 926-927, 15 Cal. 4th 951, 987-988  (Cal. 
1997) (Kennard, J., concurring) (“Finally, it is worth noting that new possibilities for unfairness arise as 
arbitration ventures beyond the world of merchant-to-merchant disputes in which it was conceived into the 
world of consumer transactions….”). 
24 Id. at 927.  
25 See id. at 925 (majority opinion). 
26 See Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682 (Cal. 2000) (citing Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (A mandatory employment arbitration 
agreement (similar to the mandatory consumer arbitration contract here) is lawful if it “(1) provides for 
neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides 
for all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require employees 
to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the 
arbitration forum. Thus, an employee who is made to use arbitration as a condition of employment 
effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”). 
27 See generally AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (1998) (a series of 
principles aimed at ensuring a fair process in consumer dispute resolution). 
28 See id., Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory Committee.   
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neutral.29  Additionally, the principle also requires equality between consumer and non-
consumer in selecting a neutral and that the chosen neutral discloses “any circumstance 
likely to affect impartiality…”30   
Specific instances of conflicts of interest between arbitration organizations and non-
consumer parties to consumer arbitration influenced the Maryland legislature’s decision to enact a 
law aimed at protecting the consumer.31  For example, in 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General 
sued the National Arbitration Forum (Forum) alleging that the Forum generated revenue by 
convincing creditors to include mandatory arbitration clauses and appoint the Forum as the 
arbitrator.32  The Attorney General also alleged that the Forum, the country’s largest provider of 
debt collection arbitration, financially affiliated itself with Mann Bracken, one of the country’s 
largest debt collectors.33  The Mann Bracken law firm, based in Maryland before its collapse in 
2010, employed a debt-collection process that was inherently biased against consumers.34  Mann 
Bracken took cases to the Forum which was “connected to Mann Bracken through a common 
ownership structure,” where the arbitrators would almost always find in Mann Bracken’s favor.35  
These actions, it was alleged, hid from consumers the fraudulent nature of these associations and 
the bias of their arbitrators.36  The issue was settled with an agreement that the Forum cease to 
arbitrate credit card debt and other consumer collection disputes.37  
The Maryland legislature was also influenced by a July 2010 Federal Trade Commission 
Report titled Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation 
and Arbitration. 38  To prevent bias and unfairness in binding arbitration, the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) recommended measures to increase transparency and fairness in the 
arbitration process.  The measures included drafting contracts so consumers are aware of their 
choice to arbitrate, eliminating bias in the arbitration process and conducting arbitration so that 
consumers will be more likely to participate.39  The FTC recommended that these measures be 
adopted by Congress to create a nationwide system requiring that debt collection arbitration 
decisions be reported and made public.  Congress has yet to follow through and pass such 
legislation, leaving the states to protect their citizens.  In addition to Maryland, California and the 
District of Columbia have enacted arbitration disclosure laws similar to those recommended by 
the FTC.40 
 In an attempt to protect consumers who are not participating in arbitration with an 
arbitration organization such as AAA and JAMS who have consumer protection safeguards in 
                                                     
29 See id., Principle 3. 
30 See id., Principle 3.5.  Circumstances that might affect impartiality include: any bias or financial or personal 
interest which might affect the result of the ADR proceeding; or any past or present relationship or experience with the 
parties or their representatives, including past ADR experiences. 
31 See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note: Consumer Protection - Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act, 
Dept. Legis. Servs., 428th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011). 
32 See Complaint at 2, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arb. Forum, No. 27CV0918550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2009) (settled out of 
court) [hereinafter “Complaint”]. 
33 See id. 
34 See Jamie Smith Hopkins & Andrea K. Walker, After the Fall: Collapse of Mann Bracken, One of the Largest-
Debt Collector Law Firms, Lifts the Veil of an ‘Oppressive’ Industry, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 21, 2010, at 1C. 
35 See id. 
36 See Complaint, supra note 32.  
37 See Firm Agrees to End Role in Arbitrating Card Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at B8.  
38 See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31. 
39 See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31. 
40 See S.B. 309 Fiscal and Policy Note, supra note 31. 
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place, the Maryland General Assembly enacted the Consumer Protection –Transparency in 
Consumer Arbitrations Act in an attempt to ensure fairness in binding consumer arbitration in all 
consumer arbitrations taking place in Maryland.  As introduced by Delegate Samuel Rosenberg in 
the Maryland House of Delegates, House Bill 442 was aimed at equipping consumers with the 
tools to determine whether or not the arbitrator(s) hearing their case are neutral and to allow 
consumers to make an informed decision when choosing arbitrators.41  Proponents of the bill 
commented that, unlike in court, there is no way to discover information about arbitrators and 
their decisions because that information is kept secret. 42   The Act solves this problem by 
requiring that information about arbitrators and their decisions are published, thereby uncovering 
information about arbitration organizations and increasing transparency.  
Opponents of the bill argued that the bill could have negative effects on the consumers it 
is intended to protect.  First, by requiring publication of arbitration decisions, the arbitration 
process becomes more like a typical courtroom legal proceeding, which is what the parties had 
contracted to avoid.43  Second, publication of awards could invite burdensome and complicated 
discovery requests in subsequent disputes that could significantly increase the cost and time for 
arbitration, which is adverse to the central purpose of choosing arbitration.44  Specific industries 
also had concerns with the need for confidentially in highly regulated industries such as 
healthcare.45 
Practically speaking, the Act will allow consumers who become involved in consumer 
arbitration to examine information about arbitrators and their past decisions before choosing the 
arbitrator that will hear their case.  Theoretically, this requirement should keep the arbitrators 
honest because arbitrators and arbitration organizations who want to maintain business and 
revenue will come to decisions in a fair and transparent way to make themselves more appealing 
to the parties for whom they wish to act as arbitrators.  Moreover, the requirement opens the 
doors of the arbitration process to the consumers who are unfamiliar with how it works.  Not only 
will this allow consumers to choose arbitrators who have a history of fair decision-making, it will 
also give them insight into how the process works.   
The requirements may also benefit the state of Maryland by revealing details of 
arbitration organizations’ decisions, thereby allowing the state to take action against arbitration 
organizations that are biased in favor of non-consumers.  As in the case brought against the 
Forum by the Attorney General of Minnesota, Maryland may be able to take action against 
arbitration organizations who habitually decide in favor of repeat players in an attempt to bolster 
their business.  This could prevent issues of bias and unfairness from ever reaching the consumer.  
The required disclosures may also give the Maryland General Assembly greater insight into the 
consumer arbitration industry, allowing them to enact further regulations if necessary. 
                                                     
41 See Hearing on H.B. 442 Before the H. Comm. on Economic Matters, 428th Leg. (Md. 2011) (oral statement of 
Delegate Samuel Rosenberg, Sponsor of H.B. 442, at 1:16:30, available at 
http://mgahouse.maryland.gov/House/Viewer/?peid=790f93a2b9174df299e187ad54255d751d (noting that the purpose 
of the bill was to prevent someone who ruled against consumers in an overwhelming number of cases from being the 
required arbitrator in mandatory consumer arbitration). 
42 See id. (oral statement of Paul Bland at 1:19:00). 
43 See id. (oral statement of Robin Schavitz, Representative of Health Facilities Association of Maryland, at 
1:36:40). 
44 See id. (oral statement of Susan O’Brien, Vice President with Health Facilities Association of Maryland at 
1:34:00). 
45 See id. (oral statement of Robin Schavitz, Representative of Health Facilities Association of Maryland at 
1:35:50) (noting the secretive nature of healthcare decisions and recommending that the provisions of the Act not apply 
to long term care facilities).  
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The Act is also designed to insulate the reporting arbitration organizations from being 
sued by parties whose information is revealed pursuant to the Act.  By relieving the arbitration 
organization from liability for disclosing information about the parties to arbitration, the Act 
protects arbitration organizations from the financial and reputational effects that revealing private 
information about the parties for whom they arbitrate may create.46  This provision may work to 
encourage arbitration organizations to disclose the required information rather than risk not 
reporting to protect their reputations and prevent lawsuits for breaching confidentiality.  
However, issues may arise in implementing this provision where consumer arbitration contracts 
include a confidentiality clause that prohibits disclosure of the same information required by the 
Act.  Where the Act and the language of the contract contradict one another, the courts will likely 
need to determine which prevails.  Inviting the courts into the arbitration process defeats the 
purpose of choosing to enter into arbitration as opposed to bringing the issue before the court.  
Once the courts get involved in determining whether the requirements of the Act overcome the 
provisions of the contract, issues regarding the parties’ freedom of contract arise.  Section 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) declares that a written agreement to arbitrate in any contract 
involving interstate commerce or a maritime transaction “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”47  Additionally, section 4 of the FAA allows a party to such an arbitration agreement to 
“petition any United States district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in 
the manner provided for in such agreement.”48  If the courts respect the parties’ freedom of 
contract as called for in the FAA, all non-consumers will likely include non-disclosure or 
confidentiality provisions in their adhesionary arbitration contracts to ensure that their 
information is not disclosed under the Act.  This would, in effect, destroy any protections the Act 
was enacted to create.   
The act may also negatively affect arbitration organizations’ willingness to participate in 
consumer arbitration.  If the organizations find that reporting requirements are too burdensome or 
may uncover unsavory details about the organization, they may choose not to participate in 
consumer arbitration or purposely fail to disclose the required information and risk the penalties 
to protect their reputations.  Similarly, arbitration organizations may fear implicating themselves 
or revealing too much to the public to such an extent that they leave the business altogether, 
reducing competition among arbitration organizations and increasing the price of arbitration.  In 
addition, the new reporting requirements may also increase the cost of arbitration due to the 
increased requirements placed on the organization.  While these risks may be a concern to the 
arbitration organizations, the benefits that the consumers will experience in the form of increased 
transparency, fairness and accountability in binding consumer arbitration outweigh the potential 
risks.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
With binding and often adhesionary consumer arbitration provisions becoming the norm 
in consumer agreements, consumers are often forced to participate in an adjudicatory process 
with which they are unfamiliar.  As a result, the businesses against whom they are forced to 
                                                     
46 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 14-3905(a). 
47 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). 
48 Id. § 4. 
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arbitrate are often more advantageously situated because, as repeat players in consumer 
arbitration, they are in the position to compel arbitration organizations to find in their favor in 
exchange for continued business and revenue.  Consumers are left to fend for themselves in a 
system that is essentially set up for them to fail.  As a result, consumer arbitration has the 
potential to become highly unfair to the consumer who has no choice but to participate or forego 
the business transaction altogether.   
The Consumer Protection –Transparency in Consumer Arbitrations Act was enacted to 
prevent these fraudulent and often secretive relationships between the non-consumers and the 
arbitration organizations by requiring that the organizations disclose and publish information 
about how they decide consumer arbitration cases.  This allows consumers to make informed 
decisions regarding the appointment of the arbitrator to their cause and ensures neutrality and 
fairness in the consumer arbitration process.  While the regulations place a greater burden on the 
arbitration organization by requiring them to publish information in the specified manner, the 
benefits to the consumer and the protection of the reputation of the arbitration process as a whole 
can be seen to outweigh the costs to the arbitration organizations. 
